Sir Robert Peel’s 9 Principles of Policing – Principle #9

I am continuing my series of articles about Sir Robert Peel’s 9 Principles of Policing.

Today, my focus is on Principle #9.

Principle #9

To recognise always that the test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, and not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with them.

How do you measure how well a police department is performing? According to Sir Robert Peel, it is by the absence of crime and disorder.

Yet this response seems overly simplistic and doesn’t take into account the many factors that influence crime.

Factors That Influence Crime

According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, there are various factors that influence the crime rate for any particular area. Some of these factors include population density and the degree of urbanization, age and gender of the population, the transience of the people, poverty level, job availability, median income, modes of transportation, education level of people, family conditions, and climate. [i]

Of course, this is not an exhaustive list. Instead, it is evidence that reducing crime is a more complicated proposition than first evident.

In my career, I can recall instances when crime rose despite the department’s best efforts. In other years, significant reductions were made in crime even though the efforts of the police remained constant from the previous year.

Police leaders must be careful about taking credit for a reduction in crime because they will invariably have to take responsibility when crime rises.

Despite the many factors that influence the rise and fall of crime, few people would argue that how the police operate impacts the crime rate.

For example, a quick look at the New York Police Department’s CompStat program provides evidence of a positive impact on the crime rate.

CompStat

In 1994, the New York Police Department developed their data-driven CompStat program to address the rising crime rate in the City.

The New York Police Department’s new approach relied upon four primary components. The collection of timely and accurate information, the rapid deployment of resources, using effective tactics, and relentless follow-up. [ii]

Former Chicago Police Superintendent, Gary McCarthy, who also ran NYPD’s CompStat meetings for seven years, described CompStat this way:

“CompStat is an ideology and methodology. When the numbers aren’t good, commanders have to know:

What is the problem?

What is the plan?

What are the results to date?

Compstat is not a solution. It’s a method to obtain solutions.” [iii]

The results speak for themselves. By 1998, homicides dropped by 67 percent, burglary was down 53 percent, and robberies were down 54 percent. [iv] This decline in crime continued for many years, reaching historic lows in homicides.

Despite what appears to be a great success, some detractors suggest CompStat’s reliance on numbers has created a monster. They point to the stop, question, and frisk of hundreds of thousands of brown and black New Yorkers. [v]

Others, including Eli Silverman and John Eterno (a retired captain with NYPD), suggest that the push for arrests and results led to abusive police practices, unnecessary and counterproductive over-policing, even police commanders falsifying their crime numbers to make themselves look better. [vi] Silverman and Eterno documented these concerns in their book, The Crime Numbers Game.

Still, CompStat grew in popularity and spread to other police agencies across the United States.

In 1998, the Marietta Police Department, where I was employed, started their CompStat like program titled M-STAR; Marietta Strategically Targeting Areas with Resources. A sharp decline in crime followed for the next ten years.

Many other police departments across the country developed their CompStat like program to reduce crime in their communities.

In 2015, a study released by the Brennan Center for Justice at the New York University’s School of Law found that CompStat-style programs were responsible for a national average of a 13 percent decrease in violent crime, an 11 percent decrease in property crime, and a 13 percent decrease in homicide. [vii]

Although the true impact of CompStat on the crime rate may be in dispute, the fact that CompStat revolutionized the way police departments attack crime is not.

CompStat may have unintentionally contributed to an “unofficial” quota system or at least an unhealthy push for increased numbers.

Quotas

Historically, police leaders have put significant emphasis on numbers. In the early days of my career, a stat sheet was kept, and monthly totals of arrests, citations, etc., were published for each officer.

Of course, you want police officers to be productive and give eight hours of work for eight hours of pay. A quota system might have been the answer for some departments in the past, but that answer has many documented challenges.

The New York Police Department is no stranger to quota systems and the fallout from them. I’m not picking on the NYPD in this matter. Many other agencies have experienced similar issues. The NYPD is simply the largest police department in the country and has many documented examples of abuse.

For example, in 1957, a lawsuit was filed against the NYPD for having a department-wide traffic summons quota. In 1972, a summons quota created by an NYPD commander resulted in 1,294 parking tickets being issued in one day. [viii]

The Knapp Commission blamed narcotic and gambling unit quotas on police corruption and prevented officers from addressing these critical issues. [ix]

In 2008, NYPD Officer Polanco secretly recorded his Sergeant speaking about a requirement to have 20 citations and 1 arrest per month. The sergeant suggested that the number could rise to 25 and 1 or 35 and 1 in the future. Officer Polanco eventually filed a lawsuit as a whistleblower to expose this practice. [x]

In New York today, it is illegal for an employer to “transfer or in any other manner penalize or threaten, expressly or impliedly” a police officer “based in whole or in part on such employee’s failure to meet a quota.” [xi]

Many other states or local jurisdictions have similar restrictions.

So if quotas are prohibited, are viewed as inappropriate, and don’t work, how can police departments reduce crime and disorder without the visible action of the police mentioned by Peel?

Outcomes

The dependence on numbers is driven by measuring outcomes as a sign of efficiency and effectiveness. Nothing could be further from the truth.

In Think Again, author Adam Grant says, “Focusing on results (outcomes) might be good for short-term performance, but it can be an obstacle to long-term learning.”

There is a potential danger in rewarding police officers who produce big numbers. They may make arrests or issue citations even when that is not the best solution to a problem. Police officers may also never learn to search for other solutions.

Here are a few ways police departments can impact crime and disorder in their community without overt police action.

Alternative Measurements

The discussion below is not intended to be an exhaustive review of how police departments can impact crime and disorder in their community in non-traditional ways. Instead, it is designed as suggestions that serve as a conversation starter on the subject.

When police officers are engaged with citizen and community stakeholders, the view of us vs. them disappears. Instead, they come together and work as we on significant community concerns.

If we want police officers to be engaged with the community, they should be recognized and rewarded for that engagement. This recognition can be both formal and informal. It can also be measured on their evaluation.

An engaged citizenry is generally aware of what is going on in their community and interested in making their community safer.

Stakeholder engagement has never been more critical than it is today.

A modern police department should practice the principles of fair and impartial policing and procedural justice. Departments that operate with these principles as part of their culture will likely treat people fairly and have broad community support.

Generally speaking, police officers are more likely to believe in and engage with the principles of procedural justice when those principles are being lived out internally at their department.

Operating transparently is another critical need today. I’m not suggesting privileged information be shared. Instead, I am describing a culture of serving where the department’s policies are online. The process for filing a complaint is easy to understand, and information about the department is readily shared on social media, the agency website, and various other outlets.

Problem-oriented policing is an effective tool to use as a means to addressing crime and disorder in communities. The idea is to diagnose and solve problems that increase the risk for crimes, usually in areas experiencing elevated crime. [xii] This tool is exponentially more effective when community members are involved.

From a bigger picture perspective, citizen surveys can be a great tool to measure the attitudes, feelings, and beliefs of the community related to the police department.

In Dunwoody, a statistically validated community survey is distributed every other year. The results provide the department feedback on how the community perceives the department and how that perception changes over the years.

Rating Police Departments

Is there a way to rate your local police department?

According to retired Madison police chief, David Couper, the answer is a resounding yes.

In his book, How to Rate Your Local Police, Chief Couper first dispels four myths about factors sometimes used to measure how well a police department is operating.

Myth #1: Low crime rates show that a police agency is efficient and effective.

As mentioned previously, Couper also argues that there are many factors that affect the crime rate and the way the police department operates is just one of them.

Myth #2: A high arrest rate shows the police are doing a good job.

Couper points out that arrests are not necessarily the goal of a police department. Instead, objectives include controlling crime, maintaining order, and providing services. Arrests only relate to controlling crime.

Myth #3: A high ratio of police officers to citizens means high-quality police services.

Couper says this measure ignores the diversity among communities social-economic structures, their use of public services, the nature of their crime problems, and the expectations a community has of its police agency.

Myth #4: Responding quickly to citizen’s calls for services shows that a police agency is efficient.

Couper believes a carefully developed range of responses based on the seriousness of the call, when the incident occurred, and the needs of the caller would provide the most effective police response.

Chief Couper covers three main areas to rate your local police department. These areas include leadership, policy and organization.

For the purposes of this discussion, I will cover the five questions Chief Couper suggests asking and answering about the organization when rating your local police department.

Do police officers respect individual rights?
Does the police agency address crime and order problems by all community resources?
Does the police agency cooperate and coordinate with neighboring law enforcement agencies and other agencies in the criminal justice system?
Does the police agency communicate with the public?
How does the police agency approach the media?

Conclusion

As part of their responsibility, police officers will make arrests, issue citations, and conduct operations designed to make the community safer. We should never forget that these actions (or outcomes) should not be the primary way a department’s efficiency is measured.

Alternatively, that efficiency can best be measured by the collective culture of the agency, the relationship with the community, and a myriad of other factors, some of which were discussed here.

Counting numbers is easy!

Building long-lasting, positive relationships with the community being served are complex but critical goals.

Avoid the numbers trap.

[i] https://ucr.fbi.gov/nibrs/2012/resources/variables-affecting-crime#:~:text=The%20transience%20of%20the%20population,and%20comprehending%20the%20crime%20issue.

[ii] https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh186/files/Publications/PERF-Compstat.pdf

[iii] Ibid

[iv] Ibid

[v] https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/03/the-crime-fighting-program-that-changed-new-york-forever.html

[vi] https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/policing/spotlight/2017/02/09/compstat-computer-police-policing-the-usa-community/97568874/

[vii] https://gcn.com/Articles/2015/03/17/Compstat-report.aspx?m=1

[viii] http://jlsp.law.columbia.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2017/03/48-Bronstein.pdf

[ix] Ibid